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NOTES
was highly critical of what it considered a "restructuring" of the federal
system. 48 Justice Brennan's opinion asserts that the states have ample
political power to guard against intrusion by the federal government.
In The National League of Cities v. Usery the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional an exercise of the congressional commerce pow-
er because, in the Court's judgment, the legislation offended the
sovereignty of the states. If, in future cases, the Court strikes down
congressional legislation in the name of protecting the federal system, then
the tenth amendment may emerge as a hurdle for any congressional
enactment which would restrict or coerce state action. 49 Any such deci-
sions should define with greater clarity the character and extent of the
tenth amendment limitation.
Richard Curry
DUE PROCESS AND THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT: THE
ACADEMIC/DISCIPLINARY DICHOTOMY
Because of the unique status of the university student, expulsion from
a university raises serious constitutional problems; the courts in this area
face the difficult task of affording the student certain basic constitutional
guarantees without excessively intruding into academic affairs. The flurry
of student activism in the last decade produced increased demands for
constitutional protection in the expulsion process, and the courts have as a
result gradually expanded the student's claim to substantive and procedur-
al due process. This note will attempt to outline the current posture of due
process in the university-student relationship as a realistic compromise
between the often competing interests of traditional judicial respect for
academic wisdom and evolving social attitudes.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2485 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. The future application of the instant case may, however, be quite limited.
In footnote 17 of the majority opinion Justice Rehnquist specifically reserves
decision as to whether other congressional powers affecting the essential functions
of state governments will be subject to the tenth amendment limitation. Id.
at 2474 n.17. Justice Blackmun, the "swing" vote in the instant case, expressed
similar reservations in his concurrence: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion,
but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater." Id. at 2476.
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Due Process in Disciplinary Expulsions
It is in the area of disciplinary expulsions that the courts have shown
the greatest willingness to impose strict due process standards for the
university student, but courts have been more reluctant to extend due
process guarantees to private university students than to public university
students. Authority is divided on the necessity of a hearing prior to
expulsion from a private university, though courts are somewhat more
inclined to require a hearing if the university receives aid or tax-exempt
status from the state.' However, a few commentators believe that courts
will be forced under one of several theories, including a finding of the
necessary "state action" in disciplinary proceedings of a private univer-
sity, to afford private university students procedural safeguards equal to
those enjoyed by public university students. 2
The dramatic developments in the application of due process guaran-
tees to university students have occurred in the area of disciplinary expul-
sions from public universities. In the landmark decision of Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education,3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of students who had been expelled without a hearing from
Alabama State College for participating in a civil rights movement sit-in at
a luncheonette. In so ruling, the court clearly stated for the first time that
due process requires notice and some opportunity for a hearing before a
student can be expelled from a tax-supported college or university for
misconduct.4 The court quoted Justice Frankfurter's comment in Joint
1. Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967) (no hearing
required despite substantial financial support from Congress and HEW); Dehaan v.
Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (no hearing required, no discus-
sion of financing); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924)
(no hearing required if institution is receiving no aid from public treasury); Anthony
v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (no hearing
required despite tax-exempt status where institution was receiving no financial aid
from state); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1886)
(hearing required in event of aid from the state).
2. For discussions of the theories available to extend due process to private
university students, see Comment, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795 (1970); Judicial Intervention
in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 WILLAMETrE L.J. 277
(1969).
3. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 930 (1961).
4. One possible limitation on Dixon involves the immediate and temporary
suspension of a student who disrupts the academic atmosphere and endangers
fellow students. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub
nom. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Marin v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 377 F.
Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1973).
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Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath5 that the precise nature of
the interest involved is a paramount consideration in the determination of
what constitutes adequate due process safeguards. The court noted the
importance of a college education today as an indication of the magnitude
of the interest involved and accepted the argument that some due process
protection is desirable to prevent unreasonable action on the part of school
authorities. 6 The court concluded that the state cannot condition the grant
of even a privilege on the renunciation of a constitutional right to due
process and established general standards for disciplinary dismissal pro-
ceedings. 7
However, the Dixon majority stipulated that a full judicial hearing
might be "detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere"' and
declined to establish specific procedural standards. In the 1963 case of
Due v. Florida A&M University,9 a district court applied a liberal con-
struction of the notice and hearing requirements delineated in Dixon. The
Due plaintiffs, who had been convicted for contempt of court for violation
of a restraining order against student demonstrations, were simply tele-
phoned and advised to appear before the University Disciplinary Commit-
tee after they denied receiving a letter from the University requesting such
appearance. Each plaintiff upon presenting himself was informed of the
charges against him, and none made a request to call witnesses or secure
counsel. The court held that this procedure met the broad requirements of
Dixon and emphasized the fact that these students were accorded a full
opportunity to be heard.' 0 The court added that the touchstones in the area
of university procedural due process are "fairness and reasonableness.""
5. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
6. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d at 157: "The precise nature
of the private interest involved in this case is the right to remain at a public
institution of higher learning in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing.
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to
civilized society." But see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1972) (education not a fundamental right).
7. Id. at 158: "The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges
and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the
Board of Education. The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case."
8. Id.
9. 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
10. Id. at 403: "A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary
to due process requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by a
university disciplinary committee with qualified attorneys either present or formally
waived as in a felonious charge under the criminal law."
11. Id.
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The Due decision may perhaps be faulted for its exceedingly broad
interpretation of the Dixon criteria; at least one commentator has argued
that the presentation of charges at the hearing stage did not provide the
students adequate time to prepare their own defenses, especially in view of
the fact that the charges involved complex legal questions regarding the
contempt conviction.' 2 Although Due was only a district court opinion,
the fairness approach seems to prevail in student disciplinary expulsion
cases in both district and circuit courts,1 3 one of which cited Due in
approving the fairness approach.' 4 Consistently, the courts have limited
the holding of Dixon in dealing with specific procedural questions such as
the right to a public hearing, the right to call witnesses, the right to
cross-examination, the right to counsel, the relevance of the rules of
evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to a recording of the proceed-
ings.
Though the Dixon court did not specifically mention the possibility of
public hearings, the majority's emphasis on the adverse effects of public-
ity upon the college atmosphere would seem to preclude such hearings,
which by their very nature would tend to make notoriety inevitable.
Consistently with Dixon and the Due "fairness" reasoning, a district
court in Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education15 held that the
university's insistence on a private hearing was not a violation of due
process in that exclusion of the public "in no way tends to establish bias or
unfairness in those proceedings.' '16 Although Zanders holds that a public
hearing is not an essential element of procedural due process, it may be
advisable for universities to allow students to choose either a public or
private hearing unless the circumstances are such that a public hearing
would unduly disrupt university activities. Certainly allowing students this
choice would indicate a willingness on the part of the university to
12. Comment, Due Process and the Dismissal of Students at State-Supported
Colleges and Universities, 3 GA. ST. B.J. 101, 104 (1966).
13. Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972); Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Lai v. Board of
Trustees of East Carolina Univ., 330 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. N.C. 1971); Gardenhire v.
Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Kan. 1971); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.
Colo. 1968); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515
(D. Colo. 1966); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
14. Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972).
15. 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
16. Id. at 768.
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"remove the shroud of secrecy from disciplinary proceedings ' 17 and
would emphasize the fairness of the procedure in the eyes of students and
the public.
Court decisions have seldom held that the student has a right to
counsel at disciplinary hearings ,18 although the presence of counsel has
been a factor tipping the balance in favor of fairness in some cases. 19
However, there is some indication of a growing judicial willingness to
include a right to counsel as part of the procedural due process require-
ments in student disciplinary hearings. For example, in Esteban v. Mis-
souri State College,2 when the district court granted expelled students a
new hearing on the grounds that the first hearing was inadequate 21 and
enumerated requirements for the second hearing, it stated conspicuously
that the plaintiff-students had to be permitted to have counsel present. 22
Furthermore, although the circuit court in the Esteban appeal did not
specifically discuss the students' right to counsel, it -noted the district
court's procedural guidelines with approval and stated that due process
mandated "a hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the
case and with all necessary protective measures." 23 At least one commen-
tator has urged that universities are government agencies and must there-
fore use traditional procedures such as representation by counsel when
acting as judicial bodies. 24 Though the law is unsettled in this area, it is
difficult to understand how in any but the most extreme situations, the
presence of counsel at a disciplinary hearing could unduly disrupt the
orderly processes of university affairs. Moreover, failure to allow the
student to have counsel present, especially when other compensatory
safeguards are absent, may color the proceedings with a sufficient appear-
ance of unfairness to cause a court to invalidate the expulsion.
Although a Tennessee state court in State ex rel. Sherman v. Hy-
man25 once denied a student the right to call witnesses on the basis that the
17. Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and University Disciplinary Proce-
dures, 34 Mo. L. REV. 236, 249 (1969).
18. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Perkins, Developments
in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1141 (1968).
19. E.g., Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp 747 (W. D. La.
1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
20. 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affl'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
21. The students at the first hearing were permitted to explain their conduct to
only one of a number of persons on the disciplinary board.
22. 277 F. Supp. at 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
23. 415 F.2d at 1089 (8th Cir. 1969).
24. Note, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 323 (1968). See also Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
25. 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
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procedure would encourage students to become informers, that rationale
has not survived in modern cases. In Jones v. State Board of Education,26
the court affirmed that the right to due process guarantees the student an
opportunity to produce evidence on his own behalf.2 7 Though a university
cannot compel testimony from those outside campus and cannot impose
punishment for perjury on non-students, the student's interest in defending
himself with the testimony of witnesses outweighs these arguments; and in
the rare instances where summary procedure is necessary, the student
could be temporarily suspended rather than expelled pending full investi-
gation.28
The Esteban district court also stipulated that the students, though not
their attorney, should be allowed to cross-examine witnesses. 29 The Dixon
decision indicated that cross-examination of witnesses may not be an
essential element of due process at the university disciplinary hearing, and
courts have been somewhat reluctant to extend the right of cross-
examination even to students. In Winnick v. Manning,3" for example, the
circuit court stated that the right to cross-examine witnesses had not been
considered essential to due process; the court also concluded that cross-
examination was particularly inappropriate in this case because the student
wanted to question a witness's characterization of him as a "ringleader"
in the disruption at issue, though the characterization had no effect on the
outcome of the proceedings since the "ringleader" received the same
punishment as his co-plaintiff fellow student. Cross-examination is, how-
ever, inevitably a factor which the court will consider in determining the
overall fairness of a proceeding, and a number of universities provide for
cross-examination by counsel as well as by students.3 Although the
existence of the right to cross-examine would further shield the hearing
process from constitutional attack, some limitations on the nature of
questioning may be necessary since the hearing will not be conducted by
experienced attorneys or judges. 32
26. 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
27. See also Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967) (see the text at notes 18-24, supra); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley,
3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1886) (recognized the student's right to call witnesses on his
behalf).
28. Perkins, supra note 18, at 1140.
29. 277 F. Supp. at 652.
30. 460 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Herman v. University of South
Carolina, 341 F. Supp. 226 (D. S.C. 1971).
31. E.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
32. Perkins, supra note 18, at 1141.
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To require the university to adhere strictly to the complex rules of
evidence would place an unreasonably harsh burden on university ad-
ministrators, who are usually untrained in the law; and the Due fairness
approach is particularly appropriate in this area. For example, in Goldberg
v. Regents,33 a state court upheld the university's refusal to consider a tape
recording of the events surrounding the student's offense and held that the
university committee was not bound by the rules of evidence. There is
indeed little doubt that wholesale application of the rules of evidence to the
university disciplinary process would cause unnecessary expense and
delay." The admission or exclusion of certain types of evidence should be
a factor in the determination of the fairness issue; the rules of evidence
may serve as a valuable aid in this analytical process, but they should not
be dispositive.
The court in Zanders recommended that the university disciplinary
procedure include some system of appeal.35 The court did not explicitly
state, however, that the due process clause mandates an appeals system;
the apparent basis for the recommendation was the university's interest in
maintaining the confidence of the students and public. 36 There is no reason
that the appeal procedure need be lengthy or expensive so long as it is
basically fair to the student, and the value of such a procedure to the
enhancement of the university's image far outweighs the relatively minor
inconveniences the system might cause to some administrative officials;
the existence of an appeals system would also reduce the number of suits
since a student who loses at both the hearing and appeal stage is probably
less likely to attempt to bring the issue to litigation. More importantly, the
existence of an appeals system might at some point become an important
factor in the determination of the fairness issue.
The court in Due declared that the students had no constitutional right
to a stenographic or mechanical recording of the proceedings, 37 although
in at least one circuit court case the student had been allowed to have a
tape recording of the proceedings.38 Certainly the employment of a profes-
33. 248 Cal. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
34. Perkins, supra note 18, at 1142.
35. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968).
36. Id. at 761: "The practicality of this suggestion lies in the fact that this
would evidence one more sign of the particular institution taking initiative carefully
to safeguard the basic rights of the student as well as its own position, prior to
disciplining him for misconduct."
37. Due v. Florida A&M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
38. Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1975).
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sional court reporter for each hearing would be unreasonably expensive,
but the Due court failed to consider less expensive alternatives such as
tape recordings or summary records.39 The existence of written records
would facilitate judicial review of the proceeding and would also tend to
limit false charges by expelled students regarding the fairness of the
hearing.
Though Dixon obviously created some thorny procedural problems
regarding the nature of the required hearing process, the decision is
significant in its straightforward affirmation of a principle that had only
been implicit in previous decisions. An extremely important aspect of the
Dixon decision is that prior decisions in the same area had dealt exclusive-
ly with sufficiency of hearing;4" the fact that none explicitly denied the
necessity of a hearing gives additional cogency to the Dixon position. The
Dixon court was able to fashion a workable solution to pressing social
problems without discarding the principle that disciplinary matters are
more amenable to strict due process requirements than are academic
matters, and subsequent decisions have preserved the important academic-
/disciplinary dichotomy despite revolutionary changes in the status of the
university student.
Due Process in Academic Expulsions
Even in the wake of the historic Dixon decision, which dramatically
expanded students' due process rights in disciplinary dismissals, the courts
have steadfastly refused to impose similar requirements in the area of
academic dismissals. The historic attitude of the courts toward dismissal
for academic reasons is that overriding academic considerations dictate a
strong presumption of reasonableness in favor of the university procedure.
Thus, academic expulsion without a hearing is not a violation of due
process. 4' The courts will review such dismissal on the allegation that the
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, and will order a hearing
only in the event that the allegation is established. 42 The district court in
39. Perkins, supra note 18, at 1142.
40. People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 II1. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E. 2d
635 (1956); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Misc. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (Mich. 1924); State
ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591
(1928); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W. 2d 822 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
41. E.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Connelly v.
University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8
Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1957), cert. denied 359 U.S. 956 (1959).
42. Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975); Greenhill v. Bailey, 378 F.
Supp. 632 (S.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Connelly v. Universi-
ty of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
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Connelly v. University of Vermont43 described the discretion of school
authorities in this area as "absolute"" and clearly articulated the reason
for the judiciary's historic hands-off approach to academic affairs:
[I]n matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely
qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a
student, and efficiency of instruction depends to no small degree
upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from other
non-educational tribunals. It is only when the school authorities abuse
this discretion that a court may interfere with their decision to dismiss
a student. 45
Moreover, the standard for establishing that an academic dismissal is
"arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith ' 46 is quite high; a showing of ill
will or bad motive will be necessary. 47 The rationale for this standard
seems to be that such a purportedly "academic" dismissal is in fact based
on other than academic considerations, 48 and only when the dismissal is
clearly unrelated to academics will the courts as a rule be willing to
intervene in university affairs in the name of due process. It follows that
the rules regarding academic dismissal arise from the basic assumption
that courts lack the necessary expertise to make purely academic policy
decisions.
Academic dismissals that involve unusually serious consequences for
the dismissed student seem to constitute the sole exception to the strict rule
of judicial non-intervention. The circuit court in Greenhill v. Bailey49
reiterated the narrow arbitrariness standard but ordered a hearing because
more than mere academic dismissal was involved; the dismissal was
accompanied by a letter to the American Medical Association, claiming
that Greenhill lacked "intellectual ability" to pursue medical studies.
Because of the serious effect of this additional action, which could fore-
43. 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
44. Id. at 160.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 159.
47. Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975); Greenhill v. Bailey, 278 F.
Supp. 632 (S.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
48. The court in Connelly (see the text at note 43, supra), for example,
commented that a medical student dismissed for failure to meet academic require-
ments had stated a cause of action only to the extent that he alleged that his
dismissal was for reasons other than the quality of his work. The student in his
complaint had alleged that an instructor had decided not to give him a passing grade
because of personal animosity toward the student and regardless of the quality of
his work.
49. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
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close other opportunities for Greenhill, the court ordered a hearing. The
subsequent case of Horowitiz v. Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri5" cited Greenhill in holding that because academic dismissal
from medical school made it difficult or impossible to obtain employment
in a medically related field or enter another medical school, a hearing was
required by the fourteenth amendment.5 1 However, the holding should be
interpreted as limited to medical schools, since academic dismissal from
undergraduate universities or even from graduate schools does not stig-
matize the student to such an extent.
The recent Fifth Circuit decision of Mahavongsanan v. Hall52 is a
salient example of the tenacity with which the courts continue to uphold
the discretion of academicians in the academic realm. The plaintiff in that
case claimed that her due process rights had been violated when Georgia
State University denied her a master's degree in education after she twice
failed a comprehensive examination and also failed to complete additional
course work in lieu of the examination. The district court had cited the
Dixon decision in ruling for the plaintiff.53 But the Court of Appeals,
noting the university's stated interest in eliminating "an ongoing stigma of
erosion of their academic certification process," distinguished the Dixon
line of cases on the basis that they had been limited to disciplinary
decisions.54 The court enunciated a clear dichotomy between due process
standards in academic dismissals and due process standards in disciplinary
dismissals:
Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholarship cannot be
equated. A hearing may be required to determine charges of miscon-
duct, but a hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out the truth
concerning scholarship. 55
Mahavongsanan stands for the proposition that a decade of dramatic
social evolution did not weaken what is arguably an extremely desirable
judicial respect for the good judgment of the academic community in
strictly academic matters.
Conclusions
The legal evolution in the area of due process for the university
student has not yet run its full course. Some further extension of due
50. 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976).
51. Id. at 1321.
52. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. 401 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
54. 529 F.2d at 449.
55. Id. at 450.
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process guarantees may be desirable, particularly in the area of discipli-
nary expulsions from private universities. The "contract" approach which
has heretofore constituted the major obstacle seems today an anachronistic
characterization of the relationship between university and student, and
the "state action" argument is open to question in view of the complicated
financing of most private universities.
However, in general decisions dealing with the due process rights of
university students exemplify an enlightened judicial attitude toward the
function of the law in our complicated society. Due process by its very
nature precludes any mechanical application of a pre-determined formula
to every conceivable situation. In disciplinary matters, the issues involved
lend themselves more readily to the elaborate trappings of strict due
process. But a decent respect for society's interest in educational excel-
lence dictates greater deference to the wisdom of trained professionals in
the strictly academic sphere, including the area of academic dismissals.
Because of the primacy of national educational goals, a continuing judicial
awareness of the dichotomy between academic and disciplinary matters
will be necessary if the courts are to meet adequately the challenge of
vindicating constitutional rights while respecting academic freedom.
M. Michele Fournet
TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
IN ANTITRUST LAW
The Michigan Public Service Commission, a state agency charged
with the regulation of public utilities, approved a tariff requiring Detroit
Edison, a public utility and sole distributor of electricity in southeast
Michigan, to administer a program of providing electric light bulbs to its
customers. Since the tariff included the cost of providing the light bulbs as
an element of its regular service, Detroit Edison billed its customers only
for the electricity consumed and did not separately charge for the light
bulbs. Petitioner, a merchant engaged in retail sale of light bulbs, sued
Detroit Edison asserting that the program allowed the utility to use its
protected monopoly position to restrain competition in the sale of light
bulbs and thus to violate the Sherman Act.' The Court of Appeals, citing
Parker v. Brown,2 found that Commission approval amounted to state
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ I (1975); 2, 3 (1974); 4-7 (1970).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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